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Abstract 
In this study, we employ the Harbinson proposal and July Framework to 
compare a ‘likely’ Doha scenario with a realistic baseline. The novelty of this study is 
that we focus exclusively on the trade-led welfare impacts in selected EU member 
states. The important features of this paper are (i) the usage of the latest GTAP (version 
6) data; (ii) the focus on EU25 regions incorporating all major CAP policy instruments 
and reforms; and (iii) the inclusion of binding tariff overhangs into the Harbinson tariff 
reductions. Results show the damping effects of tariff binding overhangs on welfare 
outcomes. This and other factors which limit the gains to liberalisation mean that the 
EU25 only realises 10% of its long-run welfare gain potential defined by complete 
liberalisation.   
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the applied trade literature has tended to conform on both range 
of scenarios and the use of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database for 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulations of the WTO Doha Round agenda. 
However, given the emphasis on development issues in the Round, the potential trade-
led impacts on individual member states have been somewhat overlooked. Our study 
bridges this gap by employing the Harbinson proposals2 (WTO, 2003a; 2003b) and 
subsequent July Framework (WTO, 2004) documents to compare a ‘likely’ Doha 
scenario with a ‘status quo’ baseline scenario.  
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Brockmeier et al., (2003), Yu and Jensen (2005) and Bouet et al., (2005) have 
updated the analysis from the EU perspective through explicit implementation of CAP 
reforms (albeit in varying degrees of detail).3,4 These comparative static assessments 
examine the Harbinson tiered tariff reduction formula against a long run status quo 
baseline scenario (see footnote 8 below), although only Brockmeier et al., (2003) and 
Bouet et al., (2005) include export subsidy elimination and AMS reductions. 
Importantly, all three studies use version 5 of the GTAP database (base 1997), rather 
than the more recent version 6 (base 2001). 
Equivalent variation (EV) or real income gains to the EU25 from a WTO 
outcome in Yu and Jensen (2005) and Bouet et al., (2005) are US$9.1bn and US$8.2bn 
(1997 prices) respectively, despite the fact that in addition to the tariff reforms in Yu 
and Jensen (2005), Bouet et al., (2005) also include 55 per cent reductions in Amber 
and Blue Box support, export subsidy eliminations and imperfectly competitive scale 
effects. The reason for the difference in these estimates is in the treatment of the tariff 
reductions, where Bouet et al., (2005) check for binding overhang. More specifically, 
the percentage binding overhang, or ‘water in the tariff’ is calculated as the difference 
between the bound and applied tariff rates expressed as a percentage of the bound tariff 
rate. Thus, if the percentage binding overhang were 50 per cent, then bound tariff 
reductions would have to be greater than 50% for ‘real’ market access (i.e., applied 
tariff reductions) to occur.  
This paper builds on the existing literature in the following respects. Firstly, we 
employ the latest GTAP version 6 data as a basis for the simulations, relating to 2001 as 
the base year, and we also disaggregate the EU25 to more specific country groupings 
following Brockmeier et al., (2003) and Yu and Jensen (2005). Secondly, we model in 
detail all of the major CAP policies (e.g., production quotas, decoupled payments and 
the single farm payment (SFP), set aside, CAP budget). Finally, as in Bouet et al., 
(2005), we introduce binding overhangs into the market access and domestic support 
pillars for all countries.  
To anticipate our results, the Harbinson scenario only realises one-tenth of the 
welfare gain for the EU25 compared with ‘complete abolition of all agro-food 
protection and support’. 
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2. Methodology, Model Extensions and Scenario Design5 
We use the standard comparative static GTAP CGE model (Hertel, 1997), whilst 
in contrast to the three studies mentioned above, we employ the version 6 GTAP 
database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006).6 Version 6 is benchmarked to a later 
policy year (2001 instead of 1997 in version 5), and includes a broader regional 
coverage, improved trade and demand elasticity estimates and most importantly, 
significant refinements of the tariff protection data. More specifically, version 6 
integrates trade preferences, specific tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) (e.g., tariff rate quotas (TRQs)), through the calculation of bilateral applied ad 
valorem tariff equivalents. Since version 6 data has significantly lower effective tariffs 
than version 5, welfare impacts following tariff reform are generally smaller. 
To keep the model manageable, we report results for the following composition 
of countries: the four largest countries in the EU15 (France, Germany, Italy, UK), the 
three largest in the EU10 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) and the Netherlands, 
Greece and Spain,7 are also treated separately. The remaining EU countries are grouped 
as two regions: the ‘rest of the EU15’ (Ro15) and ‘rest of the EU10’ (Ro10). The 
remaining regions in the model are the key players on world agricultural markets (USA, 
China, India, Japan, Cairns), the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) group of Sub-Saharan 
and South African countries and a ‘Rest of the World’ (ROW) region. Given the focus 
on agriculture and food, all major EU crops and livestock sectors are disaggregated 
from the GTAP database, whilst remaining non-agricultural sectors are aggregated into 
‘raw materials’, ‘manufacturing’ and ‘services’. 
We extend the GTAP framework to include a plausible long run baseline 
scenario8 projected from the benchmark year (2001) to 2020. Against this baseline we 
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compare our ‘probable’ Doha scenario, consisting of tariff reductions (see Table 1), 
moderated by detailed binding overhang data from Buetre et al. (2004).  
 
Table 1 –Harbinson’s average tariff rate reductions 
WTO (2003a) 
Developed Countries Developing Countries 
Existing tariff  Harbinson’s reduction Existing tariff  Harbinson’s reduction 
> 90 % 60% > 120 % 40% 
> 15 % and ≤ 90 % 50% > 60 % ≤ 120 % 35% 
≤ 15 % 40% > 20 % ≤ 60 % 30% 
  ≤ 20 % 25% 
 
In addition, we abolish export subsidies and reduce Amber Box support by 60 
(40) % for developed (developing) countries, subject to Amber Box expenditure 
overhangs. In the EU, the single farm payment (SFP) is treated as being in the Green 
Box, so no expenditure limits apply.9 This contrasts with Brockmeier et al., (2003) and 
Bouet et al., (2005), who reduce EU Blue Box support by 50% and 55% respectively. 
All Blue Box expenditures in non EU countries are capped at 5 per cent of the value of 
production (i.e., de minimis). For TRQs, we increase the quota to 10% of current 
consumption. Finally, we assume that the non-agricultural sectors also have the same 
average tariff rate reductions as suggested by Harbinson for the agricultural sectors. A 
full discussion of all the model estimates is unwieldy, so we focus on the welfare (EV) 
effects here.10  
 
3. Results 
As background,11 comparing our Doha scenario with the status quo baseline 
shows a slight long run decline in arable, dairy and processed sugar activities, whilst 
there is substitution from red meat into white meat production. Given the contraction in 
primary agriculture, returns to agricultural land factors fall slightly (mainly from export 
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subsidy eliminations in the case of ‘arable’ land)12, whilst unskilled labour wages also 
fall marginally. With greater levels of binding tariff overhangs across many of the EU’s 
principal trading partners, the EU25 agro-food trade balance deteriorates €2.161bn. As 
expected, world prices in agro-food sectors rise as a consequence of the partial 
liberalisation, although by typically less than two per cent for most sectors (except in 
‘dairy’ and ‘processed sugar’ where rises are slightly greater).  
The decomposition of regional EV in Table 2 is divided into allocative 
efficiency effects, terms of trade effects, a stylised CAP budget effect (see below) and 
‘other’ effects.13 The underlying result is that the Harbinson proposal has a minor 
positive impact of €1.205bn ($US1.349bn) on EU25 real income (0.02% EU25 GDP). 
From the selected EU member states, the largest gainers as a proportion of GDP are 
Italy (0.05%), the UK and Poland (0.04%), whilst the largest net loss accrues to 
Hungary and the rest of the EU10 (-0.07%). At the global level, we estimate a real 
income gain of €7.135bn ($US7.992bn) or 0.03% of global GDP, mainly from 
efficiency gains of €7.054bn. In a separate scenario (not shown), we eliminate all 
protection and support, yielding EU25 (global) gains of €11.707bn (€67.161bn) relative 
to the baseline. Accordingly, we estimate that the EU and the World are realising trade-
led gains from the current Harbinson package of between 10 and 11% of their long run 
potential. 
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Table 2: EV impacts (€millions, 2001 prices) 
 
 % of 
GDP 
Total EV 
 
Efficiency 
Effect 
Terms of 
Trade Effect 
CAP Budget 
Effect 
‘Other’ 
Effect 
France 0.02 248.5 297.2 -116.5 72.3 -4.5 
Germany 0.03 526.6 276.4 -42.5 294.1 -1.4 
Greece -0.06 -58.1 44.6 -26.1 -73.4 -3.2 
Italy 0.05 466.0 222.8 -30.3 278.9 -5.4 
Netherlands -0.05 -169.4 160.0 -143.0 -186.2 -0.2 
Spain -0.02 -128.0 158.4 -77.8 -203.8 -4.8 
UK 0.04 452.9 212.4 -53.0 296.4 -2.9 
Czech Rep 0.01 7.1 -1.1 -11.5 21.8 -2.1 
Hungary -0.07 -31.9 -2.6 -20.0 -5.8 -3.5 
Poland 0.04 67.5 -9.3 -12.8 90.7 -1.1 
Ro15 -0.01 -131.9 410.6 -144.8 -385.7 -12.0 
Ro10 -0.07 -44.5 2.6 -13.1 -30.5 -3.5 
EU15 0.02 1206.8 1782.4 -634.0 92.8 -34.4 
EU10 0.00 -1.9 -10.4 -57.4 76.1 -10.2 
EU25 0.02 1204.9 1772.0 -691.4 168.9 -44.6 
Global 0.03 7135.3 7054.3 38.0 0.0 43.0 
 
The terms of trade effect is negative in all EU regions. Since the binding 
overhang for many of the EU25’s principal agro-food trading partners (except Japan and 
the USA) is large, our competitors have greater insulation from multilateral tariff 
reductions. As a consequence, the reform results in increased imports to the EU25.14 To 
preserve the external trade balance closure of the model, EU25 exports must rise to 
offset the influx of imports. This can only be achieved through improved 
competitiveness which implies falls in factor prices, export prices, and subsequently a 
terms of trade deterioration of -€0.7bn. This loss is concentrated in the EU15 (-€0.63bn) 
because of its considerably larger extra-EU trade links than the EU10.  
Reductions/eliminations in market distortions (output subsidies, export 
subsidies, import tariffs) have net positive efficiency impacts of €1.772bn in the EU25 
from improved resource reallocation,15 of which €1.782bn accrues to the EU15. This 
implies a small negative efficiency impact on the EU10. In part, this result reflects the 
fact that domestic support and export subsidy distortions are minimal to zero in the 
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EU10. Moreover, with the majority of EU10 trade being intra-EU, Doha related 
liberalisation reduces intra-EU trade-led efficiency gains in the EU10 relative to the 
status quo baseline experiment.  
The change in the CAP budget effect is decomposed in Table 3 into CAP 
expenditures from Brussels (column 2) by component parts (columns 2a, 2b, 2c), and 
budgetary contributions, both in the form of agricultural tariff revenues (column 3) and 
a share of non-CAP related own resource contributions (column 4) to cover the balance 
of net CAP expenditure.16 CAP expenditures shrink by -€3.624bn relative to the 
baseline largely due to reductions in export subsidies and Amber Box support. With 
improved market access to the EU, the model estimates tariff revenue falls, whilst lower 
EU25 own resource contributions are a consequence of the reduction in CAP 
expenditures.   
 
 Table 3: Decomposition of the CAP Budget Effect (€millions 2001) 
 
 1.CAP 
Budget 
2.CAP 
Exp. 
2a.Export 
Subs. 
2b.Amber 
Box 
2c.Int-Input 
Subs. 
3.CAP 
Tariff 
4.Own 
Resources 
Fra 72.3 -723.6 -620.6 -80.2 -22.8 -46.6 -749.3 
Ger 294.1 -394.1 -384.7 -1.2 -8.1 -66.1 -622.1 
Gre -73.4 -119.6 -82.1 -36.8 -0.6 -3.5 -42.7 
It 278.9 -456.8 -367.6 -78.5 -10.7 -27.0 -708.8 
NL -186.2 -390.6 -374.9 -11.5 -4.3 -35.4 -169.0 
Spa -203.8 -430.2 -113.5 -313.1 -3.6 -16.7 -209.7 
UK 296.4 -183.7 -133.7 -46.3 -3.7 -51.9 -428.2 
Cze Rep 21.8 -7.4 -6.3 -0.8 -0.3 -1.8 -27.4 
Hun -5.8 -19.6 -0.8 -18.3 -0.6 -0.4 -13.3 
Pol 90.7 -7.5 -1.3 -5.6 -0.6 -2.7 -95.5 
Ro15 -385.7 -816.2 -566.1 -220.1 -30.0 -28.7 -401.8 
Ro10 -30.5 -74.7 -0.8 -73.9 -0.2 -3.0 -41.2 
EU15 92.8 -3514.8 -2643.2 -787.7 -83.9 -276.0 -3331.6 
EU10 76.1 -109.2 -9.1 -98.7 -1.7 -7.9 -177.4 
EU25 168.9 -3624.0 -2652.2 -886.4 -85.6 -283.9 -3509.0 
 
The UK, Germany and Italy are large net contributors to the stylised CAP 
budget used here. A reduction in CAP expenditures from the Harbinson package brings 
benefits to these countries of €0.296bn, €0.294bn and €0.279bn respectively. In 
contrast, as large net beneficiaries, Greece and Spain lose €0.073bn and €0.204bn 
respectively. For France, the significant budget contributions and the substantial CAP 
support receipts largely cancel each other, resulting in a net budget effect of €0.072bn. 
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The Netherlands is also a large net budgetary contributor, but loses since its share of 
export subsidies, which are eliminated, is considerable in proportion to its relative size. 
The Czech Republic and Poland are net beneficiaries from the CAP, although the 
impact of the Harbinson proposal is very minor since neither has significant Amber Box 
or export subsidy protection (the majority is tied up in the SFP). Hungary has 
historically been close to or above its Amber Box ceiling limit in local currency terms 
due to inflationary problems. Thus, its Amber Box reductions from the 2001 benchmark 
result in net CAP budgetary losses. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
Compared to the existing literature, our EU25 (and global) estimates appear at 
the low end of the range of results, where modest gains are now an important  
characterising feature of the recent Doha related CGE trade studies in the literature 
(Ackerman, 2005). This is primarily because of our treatment of binding overhangs, and 
use of version 6 GTAP data.17 In addition, we do not incorporate ‘welfare boosting’ 
modelling features such as imperfect competition, trade-productivity linkages or NTB 
protection (e.g., in services),18 whilst EU25 allocative efficiency gains are reduced since 
we assume full decoupling by 2020. 
Furthermore, the explicit representation of CAP market rigidities19 (see 
Philippidis et al., appendix, 2006) impedes the release of factors of production from 
agricultural to non-agricultural uses from agricultural liberalisation. This has a 
moderating impact on the efficiency estimates reported in Table 2, both within and 
outside of the EU25.  
Considerable work remains for a meaningful trade deal to be struck. If these 
results are accepted – that the EU25 is only realising 10% of its potential benefit from 
complete liberalisation – the EU (inter alia) must assume a more positive stance at the 
negotiating table. 
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 In an earlier version of this study excluding binding overhangs, EU25 EV gains were estimated at €4bn. 
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 In his insightful literature review, Ackerman (2005) notes the danger of using ‘speculative extensions’ 
(p.2) when reporting welfare results from trade liberalisation. 
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sector specific treatment of ‘arable’ and ‘non-arable’ land. It should be noted that in some cases the broad 
sectoral aggregation excludes the possibility of including TRQ’s on narrow product definitions which will 
only account for a minority proportion of trade along the route. A similar argument also applies to the 
composite ROW region which includes a considerable number of regions which do not employ TRQs and 
for simplicity is excluded from the TRQ treatment. 
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